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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
::ABBibJ C. SORENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.SORENSEN,
Def end ant and Respondent.

~. ~IORGAN

Case No.
11013

PETITION FO·R REHEARING
Defendant-respondent now petitions the Court, under
Hnle 7fi (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for rehearing
.,f th<' aho\·e entitled matter and asserts that, in making
its decision herein, this Court erred in the following
partil'ulars:
1. By ruling that defendant-respondent's reduction in salary of $6,000.00 per year was "voluntary" and therefore not properly to be
considered as a ground for alimony modification.
2. By ruling that the record does not support
the contention that the original alimony decree
was based, in part, upon the trial court's conviction that the major expense of rearing the
parties' daughter, then living with plaintiff-

1

appellant, had ht•en assumed hy plailltiff
appellant.
3. By ruling that no E'Yidrnce ·was g-i"n•n u1
offoned to show that tlwre had hccn ~uh
stantial improyemcnt in the liq11iclity of am.I
the income from the ·\\'ife 's separate property
4. By failing to defer to the trial rourt 's di~.
cretion in regard to the modification of illi
alimony award.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. ALLEN

CLYDE;, l\IECHAM & PRATT

351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Res1J011de1d
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BRIEF IN SUP'P'ORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
'S REDUCTlON IN SALARY OF $6,000.00 PER YEAR
~WAS "VOLUNTARY" AND THEREFORE
0:'0T PROPERLY TO BE CONSIDERED AS
.\ GROUND FOR ALIMONY MODIFICATIO;.J.
1H~FT~~DANT-RESPONDENT

In her brief on the appeal from the order modifying
plaintiff-appellant asserted that defendantn~~pornlent had "voluntarily" accepted a $6,000.00 per
Y(';n· recludion in income.
There is no support in the
11rnr1l for tl1c assertion that the reduction was volu;ntary.
Tlw <rnl.\- evidence relating to the reduction is the minute
( illl')' of the resolution effecting it.

niimon.\-,

,\s a matter of fact, defendant-respondent strongly
11·~ic:kd the reduction of his income. The trial court
thought it unnecessary for defendant-respondent to put
on extem;ive proof that he opposed the reduction of his
in(·omc'. In the absence of evidence, it is hardly proper
t'r 1r tliis Court to rule that the trial court was obliged
I 11 11ss 11 me defendant's concurrence in the reduction as
11

111altcr of laze.
l 1~n·n if defendant-respondent had not opposed the

11

·rl1wtion, the circumstances which prompted it were

3

beyond his control. Defendant had been working ,
minimum of GO hours per zceek (Record, pages 53, 4) ti1
produce the income on which the trial court, by thr>
original decree, impressed what \Ve believe to be th(·
heaviest alimony burden in Utah's family relations history. Defendant is now 55 years of age, an age at which
he could have been expected to decelerate even had hii
marriage to plaintiff-appellant not deteriorated. What
this court appears to be telling defendant is that he must
continue to u·ork a 60 hour week until his death. The
Court binds him to this servitude in order to maintain
for plaintiff, who has never worked, an alimony income
(disregarding return from a now liquified property
award of over $100,000) higher than the salary of district
court judges.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
CONTENTION THAT THE ORIGINAL ALIMONY DECREE vV AS BASED, IN PART,
UPON THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTENTION
THAT THE MAJOR EXPENSE OF REARING THE PARTIES'S DAUGHTER, THEN
LIVING WITH PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
HAD BEEN ASSUMED BY PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT.
There is no question whatsoever that Christine, thr
parties' daughter, had reached her majority by the time
of the divorce. One of the major points relied upon hy
plaintiff in arguing for the notoriously high award in
this case was:
4

''Mr. Sorenson disclaims anything but a
moral obligation on a voluntary basis with respect
to Christine, who still lives with her mother while
attending the University and who is unmarried."
Tliis is an exact quote from an exhibit (Exhibit 4) prepared hy plaintiff to persuade the Court to impose a

heavy burden on defendant. Whether or not plaintiff
al'f11ally assumed the major expense of Christine's maintenance before her marriage, it is clear that the trial
judge was induced to establish the level of defendant's
ohligations on the representation that plaintiff would
l1ace to assume that expense.
'rhe very same judge who signed the decree also
ordered the modification. He knows to what degree he
was influenced, in fixing the alimony, by the plaintiff's
nssertiou that she would have to take care of Christine.
It is not important that defendant may have contributed
1o (:hristine 's maintenance; what is important is that
the trial court, in preparing the decree, assumed that
defendant would not contribute.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS GIVEN OR
OFFERED TO SHOW THAT THERE HAD
BEEN SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN
THE LIQUIDITY OF AND THE INCOME
~'ROM THE WIFE'S SEPARATE PROP~~RTY.

Ddendant-respondent has twice protested, before
tlii:-; Court, the manifest inequity entailed in the award

5

to plaintiff-appellant of a large portion of defrndaut',
inheritance as a part of the marital estate. X everthell·~,,
the conrt has nplwlcl th(• award to plaintiff of properly
':alned nt approximately $12;),000.00. :\Inch of the valnl
of the property awarded plaintiff, hO"wever, lay in a
lar,c.;c pieee of realty inelnc1i11g the home in which the
parties hacl lin'c1. This was not income prodneiug property ancl not n'adily marketable hccause so fe,y people of
the community can afford so palatial a residence. This
factor \ms heavily ex11loitccl by plaintiff-appellant in
lier argumc11t for the high lcYel of payments defendant
wns ordered to make. Again we quote from plaiidi/f'.1
cxhil1it ( l<~xhil)it +) prcsenkL1 to the trial court at t111,
time of the frial of the original cause:
"One of the nove 1 features of the case is a
plan of orderly liquidation of the assets witl1 high
intrinsic ntlues hut not readily marketable."
'' ]j~arl!- in the controversy the defendant
stopped plaintiff's credit with former trade accounts including the srn-ices of I\Ir. Don Andrns,
tl1<:> gardener, and Kent Anderson the handy man.
:\[rs. Sorensen re-employed l\Ir. Andrus for work
around the home and the adjourning acreagr•,
honowing money for that purpose, she incapable
of performing the necessary physical labor in the
premises.''
Plai11tiff 's argument to the trial court was this:
>"OU haYe g-in•11 nw \'aluahle property, lmt its O\Y11cn:hip
is not au m1mixccl hkssing. I ha,,e to pay a. man to
maintain it. This factu1· should he recognized when the
eonrt clPeiclcs how mnch m011Py the dcfcrn1ant has to pay.
By the timr' of the hc:ui11g
6

011

the petition for modi

l'ic;llio11, this situation ha<l completely changed. The
ltu11-11rodnc-tive property had been sold (Record 69).
J)(·frndant-respondent offered to prove that plaintiff:1ppella11t liad received her share of the sale proceeds
111 ('/l sh ( Heconl 70) and the amount of those proceeds.
!'i<lilltiff-appellant ol;jected to such evidence, and the
1 ri;d rourt refused to receive it.
It is frustrating, indeed, to read in this Court's
ilL·cic:ion that no eYidence >vas adduced or offered as to
t!H· sale of the non-productive assets and the amount of
tl1r: prnceeds. Defendant-respondent did testify that the
prnpc•rty \ms sold and offered to prove that plaintiff
n·cciH·d her sharC> in cash. If this Court now concludes,
n., we do, that it was C>rror for the trial court to exclude
tLl' e\-idc·nce of plaintiff-appellant's cash receipts from
tlH• i'ale, then this Court should remand the cause with
iw-:t met ions that the trial court receive the evidence.
ft' a trial court has committed error by refusing to
aclmi1 competent evidence offered by a losing litigant,

tl:is comt remands the cause with instructions that the
trial ('onrt receive the evidence. vVe fail to see the justice
i11 n·n·rsing- a trial court decision on the grounds that
it w•eds the support of Hidence which was offered but
11ot recei ,-e1l, hut denying the prevailing party the opporlunit>· to present that evidence.
Dc•frndant-respoudent 's proof is that, at the time
f tl1P (lecree, plaintiff's alimony income was decreased
I·~- t lie cost of maintaining the aforesaid realty. At the
lim1· of the hearing on the petition for modification,

11
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plaintiff's alimony income was or should have been
angmcnted by return on investment of cash received
from the sale of that realty. The Record, in our view,
sufficiently supports those finding·s now because it con.
tains the evidence that the parties have sold the prop.
erty about which plaintiff complained because it was
costly to maintain.
The trial judge alone knows to what degree he was
influenced, in fixing the alimony level, by plaintiff's
nrgument that she must hear the expense of maintaining
the estate on which she was living. This same judge
Eigned the order reducing the alimony.

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING
TO DEFER TO THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION IN REGARD TO THE MODIFICATION OF AN ALIMONY AW ARD.
\Ve have pointed out that the judge who originally
heard the cause also heard the petition for modification
and signed the order. If he originally believed (as plain·
tiff urged him to believe) that plaintiff would have to
maintain Christine through college and that plaintiff
was unable to maintain her residence without hiring help,
there is plenty of evidence in this record that those problems no longer existed in 1967.
The trin] judge has statutory discretion to make
such chang0s in a cliYorce decree as may be ''reasonable
and proper.'' This Court has often said it will not
8

distnrh au order effecting such a change unless there
lrns been an abuse of discretion.
We submit that, by the decision herein, this Court
lias disregarded the element of trial court discretion.
CONCLUSION
This Court has declared, without justification, (1)
that defendant-respondent's reduction in income was
rnluntary and (2) that no evidence was adduced or
offered to show the changes in Plaintiff-appellant's
financial condition which the trial court found.
If the record fails to support the findings m any
mat0rial respect, it is because the trial court refused
lo receive competent evidence. At the very least, defendant should be permitted to present his evidence
d1irh so clearly demonstrates significant amelioration
i11 plaintiff-appellant's income and expense situation
~.mrP the original decree.

Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. ALLEN
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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